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Through a comparison of the widely-held traditional view of science with 
the constructivist view of science, we argue that the constructivist view of the 
content of science has important implications for classroom teaching and 
learning. This alternative view of science concepts as human constructs, 
scrutinised by application of the rules of the game of science, raises many 
challenges for teachers. Reconceptualisation of teachers' views of the nature 
of science and of learning in science is important for a constructivist 
pedagogy. We argue here that open discussion of the 'rules of the game' of 
science would contribute to better learning in the classroom, since learners 
would be better equipped to change their existing concepts by knowing more 
about the nature of science itself. 
• The traditional image of science 
Many teachers hold the view that: 
• science knowledge is unproblematic 
• science provides right answers 
• truths in science are discovered by observing and experimenting 
• thoices between correct and incorrect interpretations of the world are 
based on commonsense responses to objective data. 
This traditional image of science has been explored in a large number of 
commentaries; see, for example, Chalmers (1976), Nadeau and Desautels 
(1984). 
Teaching based on this traditional view of science attempts to transmit to 
learners concepts which are precise and unambiguous, using language capable 
of transferring ideas from expert to novice (teacher to student) with precision. 
Textbooks are sources of facts and theories about the concrete world, 
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exemplified by the following extract from a textbook about teaching science 
in the primary school, Jacobson and Bergman (1980): 
'Electrical energy can be converted into other forms of energy. As we 
have seen electrical energy can be transferred -considerable distances 
along conductors. Another great advantage of electrical energy is that it 
can be readily converted into other forms of energy.' (p. 44) 
The expectation is that teachers read this material, come to the same 
understandings as the authors, and then transmit the concepts to their 
students. The students who learn these statements come to know about 
electrical energy. There are a number of problems here. 
• Study of the ideas students bring to lessons about energy reveals a variety 
of person-centred views related to 'needing energy to do things', 'needing 
food as a source of energy', and 'switching off appliances to save energy'. 
The textbook quote ignores these alternative conceptions, treating energy 
as a secure and certain idea in a manner which encourages rote learning of 
phrases with no connection to the learner. 
• Energy is a very difficult and complex idea invented by scientists. Arguments 
about the appropriate way to understand and to teach energy continue in 
education journals (see the debate between Warren, Schmidt, Lehrman, 
Hicks, Richmond and others in Education in Physics and Physics Teacher in the 
early 1980s). The textbook quote above treats this area as if there were no 
difficulty in the concept. Many students can feel that their inability to 'see' 
the world in the same way as the textbook writer means that they are 
somehow 'blind' or not seeing the world through the same spectacles. 
Teachers who are themselves insecure in their knowledge of science can 
find the uncomplicated transmission of knowledge attractive (Osborne and 
Freyberg, 1985). Transmissive teaching avoids discussion (since learners lack 
knowledge worthy of consideration) and interactions which might reveal 
teachers' uncertain knowledge and so alter power relationships in their 
classrooms. The view of science as a body of unambiguous right answers for 
transmission into learners' heads can then trap teachers into a teaching style 
inimical to their own and their students' learning, or into avoidance of the 
subject entirely. 
A further concern about the consequences of this image of science and 
good learning is that students who commit the 'facts' to memory are seen to 
possess a 'natural' ability in science. Other students are given messages that 
they are not expected to perform as well. Although having a good memory is 
an undeniably valuable attribute, there is a good deal of evidence that the 
memorised knowledge is not well understood. Teaching which values a skill 
that may not be strongly linked to ability in science can alienate the bulk of 
students from the discipline before they have properly experienced it. 
Although this picture is extreme, a great deal of current practice in science 
teaching conforms quite closely to this picture of the interaction between 
science content and pedagogy. Fensham (1985) has argued that this is 
unhelpful to learning in science for all students. 
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~ An alternative paradigm 
The traditional view of science and consequently of the language of science 
has been scrutinised, particularly in the last two decades, through 
considerations of: 
• the history and philosophy of science 
• the psychology of learning. 
This scrutiny has resulted in science being located in a new paradigm 
(Kuhn, 1970) in which the nature of science and of learning in science is 
viewed differently. The new paradigm regards science as a human and social 
construct, and views learning as the personal construction of new knowledge. 
As a consequence, many of the old securities about the pedagogy of science 
are seen to be problematic. 
Arguments for this new paradigm come from: 
• the history and philosophy of science. Our perception of the world is seen to be 
subjective. Observations are enmeshed with previous experience of, and 
existing theories about, the world. We construct meaning for the world 
around us from our prior attempts to make sense of it. The traditional view 
of scientific method as the objective scrutiny of hypotheses by reference to 
unproblematic facts (based on observations) and the consequent rejection of 
incorrect hypotheses which do not agree with these facts, is now disputed 
as a description of scientific practice. The alternative constructivist 
paradigm is less clinical and more human. These are qualities which could 
well make this view more accessible to young learners. 
• the psychology of learning. Newer theories see learning as interaction with 
previously-existing concepts, and as the building of new mental constructs 
from prior understandings (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985; Driver, 1988). In 
these new theories of learning there is increasing recognition of the 
importance of the affective dimension in learning; even in the apparently 
abstract and objective disciplines of science and mathematics (Claxton, 
1991). How we feel about the ideas being presented in our learning 
experiences affects our learning about them. (In this age of concern for 
animals it would be unwise in the extreme to introduce biology with a 
programme based on the dissection of small animals!) 
Considerations of the importance of contexts to learning are allied to this 
affective dimension. The context in which we learn something affects the way 
that individuals construct knowledge. Learning about a scientific concept 
may be much easier through contexts with rich links to students' interests, 
such as teen culture and the human body (Rodrigues, 1992). 
A further complication when considering learning in science is the 
developing realisation that individual students hold many, often conflicting, 
concepts about their world, some of which they use in the school classroom, 
others in the world outside. Within the chemistry classroom students respond 
that the world is made up of atoms and molecules, but they talk of materials 
in their 'real world' in quite different terms, denying that blood and skin and 
wood are molecular, or even chemicals (Happs, 1980). These multiple theories 
164 Section C Curriculum issues 
can be used differently depending on context. Learners of science who have 
categorised humans as animals will enter a butcher's shop displaying a sign 
'No Animals Allowed' without demur (Bell, 1981). A significant challenge to 
teachers is to make the science learned in school appropriately available in the 
real world of the student. Much of the discussion about enhancing learning of 
science seeks ways to make the content of science more plausible, intelligible 
and fruitful for learners (Hewson and Thorley, 1989), thus helping them to 
make better sense of their world. Whilst accepting that this is a very 
important activity, this chapter argues that some examination of the process 
whereby science concepts are constructed is also important. The way that 
constructs are scrutinised, in other words the rules of the game of science, 
deserves consideration in teaching and learning. If science is a collective 
construct then exploration of the constraints on this process of construction 
deserves to be part of classroom interactions. 
t Constructivist teaching approaches 
If students come to lessons with ideas about their world which already make 
sense to them, then teaching needs to interact with these ideas, first by 
encouraging their declaration and then by promoting consideration of 
whether other ideas make better sense. These procedures have been outlined 
in the generative teaching approach of Osborne and Freyberg (1985) and the 
interactive teaching approach of Biddulph and Osborne (1984) and further 
discussed in Driver (1990). 
A feature of this approach to science teaching is that the outcomes can be 
different for different students. Some may want to explore a concept in 
considerable detail and will develop understandings closer to those of the 
scientist, while others will be more interested in exploring practical and 
personal aspects of the topic. This diversity of outcome poses problems for 
teachers. The outcome from traditional science lessons is also diverse, though 
assessment procedures that rely heavily on recall and rote learning conceal 
them. When understanding is probed at a deeper level the learning is often 
found to be superficial, even for students who have been described as very 
successful. The problem for learners who are described as successful is that they 
are often unaware of the partial nature of their development of a particular 
concept, and find difficulty in contemplating change to their ideas. Procedures 
in which there is more conversation about learning provide a better base for 
further learning. The open negotiation of meaning, and appreciation of the 
partial nature of the learning achieved, also model a better image of science. 
• The process of developing science content in 
constructivist teaching 
Rather than discussing constructivist teaching in a generalised manner, the 
remainder of this chapter refers to three topics, floating and sinking, energy and 
photosynthesis, and considers some possible references to the process of 
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science which could be introduced when these are the focus of learning in the 
classroom. The discussion draws on research into teaching and learning about 
these concepts, particularly that reported in Biddulph (1983), Osborne and 
Freyberg (1985) and Carr, Hayes and Symington (1991) on floating and 
sinking; in Carr and Kirkwood (1988) on energy; and in Barker and Carr 
(1989) on photosynthesis. 
Floating and sinking is an appropriate topic for detailed consideration 
since it is a common topic in primary science programmes, often assumed to 
provide no particular problems for learners (the New Zealand Minister of 
Education recently stated that knowing that heavy things sink is a significant 
beginning to early learning in science). Energy is another concept introduced 
to primary school students; the argument being that a fundamental concept 
in science should be introduced in a simple manner at an early stage in 
learning. Photosynthesis is also seen to be a fundamental concept, most 
commonly introduced through the notion of plants using energy from the sun 
to make their own food; a notion that has a number of difficulties for learners. 
Teachers reflecting on their pedagogy could usefully consider five 
questions as they develop their teaching approaches and reflect on student 
learning. These are: 
• does nature contain a definition of the concept which can be uncovered 
through appropriate experiences? 
• how does science develop a statement of a concept? 
• is there a single explanation for a phenomenon which teachers should aim 
at? 
• can science always provide an answer to a question? 
• when a 'better' explanation is proposed how do scientists decide to accept 
it? 
These five questions raise a number of important issues about the concepts 
in science and consequently about science pedagogy. The following sections 
consider each in turn. 
Question 1: Does nature contain a definition of floating and 
sinking, energy, and photosynthesis which can be uncovered 
through appropriate experiences? 
The implied view of much science writing in texts and teaching is that a word 
such as floating has a meaning which exists in the world. This meaning is seen to 
be independent of people, unambiguous, and apparent to the trained and 
careful observer. Through a process of exploration of their world, learners are 
expected to unearth this true meaning of the word, provided that a teacher 
guides the process with skill. 
The word 'floating' does not, however, seem to have exact meaning derived 
unambiguously from experience. This is apparent when we look at some 
instances (Figure 14.1). The first example, the apple, may seem obvious and 
uncomplicated. Surely the apple is floating. Yet some young people will say 
that the apple is partly floating and partly sinking (which makes sense if your 
idea of floating is to be above the surface of the water and of sinking is to be 
166 Section C Curriculum issues 
Figure 14.1 Instances and non-instances of 'floating' 
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Stones dropped 
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Empty plastic 
bottle tied to 
rock 
Person swimming 
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Person wearing a 
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water looking at 
fish 
-- -:::::... 
Speedboat going 
fast 
A yacht in trouble 
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below that surface). If the illustration of the stones dropped into water showed 
one of the stones partly above the surface then the logic of this view could be 
that some of the stones are sinking but that one is floating. Consider the person 
under the water looking at fish. Is the person floating? If our concept of 
floating is that something is to be above the surface of the water, then the answer 
is no. If we know that an apple pushed under water will bob up again when 
we release it we may decide that floaters can be submerged temporarily, but 
that they remain floaters. How would this affect our response to the survey 
question about the underwater swimmer? We know that divers can swim back 
to the surface, unless something goes wrong (and the person illustrated does 
not look distressed). By this argument perhaps the person is floating. Another 
view of floating involves the common experience of feeling supported by the 
water. From this viewpoint the diver is floating, even although submerged. The 
same considerations apply to the submarine. Further complexities arise when 
we turn to the yacht in trouble. In our normal use of language the yacht is 
sinking but in the illustration it is still floating, if only just! The person 
swimming may set off different associations depending on our own 
experiences. For some people water is a dangerous environment, raising fears 
of drowning. This illustration then shows a person who is going to drown if 
he/ she stops swimming. Other responses may arise from a personal 
experience of comfort in the water, knowing that when you cease swimming 
you can float. Each association could lead to a different response. The person 
swimming has introduced a puzzling new dimension, that of movement. The 
same problem applies to the stone skipping along on top of the water. We 
know that most stones would sink if they stop moving (in a country like New 
Zealand where pumice is often found there are stones which float!). Does that 
mean that they are floating? The same difficulties apply to the speeding boat. 
Complications seem to be piling up endlessly but the point to make can 
now be stated clearly. The idea of floating does not exist sharply defined in 
nature. We need to construct a meaning for it - which is just what scientists 
have done. Their concept of floating and sinking refers to many experiences, 
and tries to make their observations more coherent. In the process, they have 
invented concepts which at times they have agreed to change. This is a good 
description of science, and one we argue should be shared with learners as 
their learning in science is developing. 
Similar considerations apply to the concepts of energy and photosynthesis. 
As learners (both students and teachers) explore their concepts, they will find 
that there are a number of conflicting ideas (concepts of energy may centre on 
food, and on people having or requiring energy). Conservation of energy is a 
difficult construct when prior ideas strongly support the need for continual 
supplies of food to keep one's energy up, and, paradoxically, when people 
exercise vigorously to build up their energy! Prior ideas related to 
photosynthesis are also likely to require consideration. The concept of plants 
making their own food from the energy of the sun contains many pitfalls, 
particularly when it is commonly held that plants get their food from the soil, 
and the idea of invisible gases providing the substance from which plant 
material is constructed has so few links to prior experiences. 
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There are, then, no definitions of these concepts to be uncovered by 
appropriate experiences. Rather, each construct is gradually made from many 
instances, and its power is dependent on bringing together many related 
ideas. 
Question 2: How does science develop a statement of a 
concept such as floating and sinking, energy, or 
photosynthesis? 
The survey on floating and sinking provjdes clues to the answer to this 
question. Development of a construct of floating first confronts the 
complexi.ty of our rich world of experience. Scientists, for very good reasons, 
aim to reduce this richly complicated world of experience to a more 
manageable, tidied-up one. For science to 'work', concepts are sharply 
focused on aspects chosen to be relevant and reproducible. Paradoxically this 
process leads to concepts which have very great power in making predictions 
about the world, and this is the 'pay-off' which has made science one of the 
great human inventions. 
In the case of floating and sinking, the scientists' construct first seeks to 
make these two possibilities mutually exclusive (something is either floating 
or sinking, and ambiguities such as partly floating and partly sinking, floating 
now but about to sink, are avoided). The iceberg, then, is viewed by science 
as floating, even though many people will tell you that the part below the 
water is sinking and the rest is floating. The total system is defined as an 
instance of floating. By reducing the complexity of the real situation, simpler 
and tidier statements can be made. The person in a life-jacket provides a 
further illustration. We might think that the person is sinking and the life-
jacket provides support so that the sinking person can float. Again by treating 
the system as a whole, science chooses a simpler more reduced view of the 
world. So the first strategy is to treat systems as a whole. A similar decision 
about defining a system needs to be taken when energy is the focus of 
teaching and learning. Many of the problems associated with this topic are 
clarified by clearly defining a system and a change to that system. Students 
were often unsure whether to remove the human operator from systems. 
Switching on a light implied the use of muscles, and before objects could be 
dropped they had to be raised or pushed by a person (Carr and Kirkwood, 
1988). 
The next decision about floating is to shift the focus from the surface of the 
water. The new construct considers something to be floating if it is supported 
by the water (even if it is under the water). This extends the concept to more 
situations. The yacht in trouble is therefore considered to be floating since it 
is still supported by the water. This example provides a further instance of the 
way that meanings for concepts are constructed in science. The situation is 
treated as it is at the moment, regardless of what may happen next or what may 
have happened before. Science often takes this view of the world, 
disregarding the past history of an event, and any possible future. This 
provides a sharper focus, even though information from our prior knowledge 
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is now ignored. Of course, in everyday language the yacht seems to be sinking 
(though some can float like this for days), but the scientists' construct is that 
at the moment it is floating. It is valuable to think about how this construction 
of meaning does not always remove some difficulties. Consider now the 
empty plastic bottle tied to a rock. The bottle is described by science as floating 
although many people would describe it as sinking or sunk since it is beneath 
the water. Is the scientists' response based on the understanding that if the 
bottle is released it will float to the surface? This is not the case. The scientist 
is not using knowledge of what might happen in the future. The decision is 
based on seeing the bottle as being supported by the water (experiencing an 
upthrust) and therefore floating. This reduction to a simpler, more extended 
concept is typical of the process of science. Indeed, the concept of floating and 
sinking has been extended by science to liquids and gases other than water. 
Focusing on the moment and using the concept of support provides a more 
powerful idea. By this process science has been developed as an interrelated 
set of constructs about the world, in which carefully defined ideas work 
together to inform us about much of our experience of the physical world. 
When scientists decide to confer onto a word a particular, more exact 
definition, this is an act of construction from the world of experience 
significant to scientists. The process of teaching and learning ought to engage 
with this 'rule of the game' and its consequences. 
The concepts of energy and photosynthesis have also been constructed by 
selection and reduction from the world of experience and of ideas, and their 
modern meanings are powerful because of this. Realisations that different 
phenomena such as heat, electricity and mechanical work could be 
quantitatively interconverted led to the invention of the concept of energy 
and of its conservation. Photosynthesis is an elaborated concept which 
depended for its clarity on unravelling of the concept of gases, as well as the 
development of the concept of energy. The power of the ideas has a great deal 
to do with their connectedness, which is why teaching can not expect 
successfully to develop the concepts from a single experience or a few isolated 
experiences. Neither can teachers expect to help students change their 
concepts without deliberate explorations of their connectedness. 
In the process described above, science has often reinterpreted experience 
and as a result the words of science have changed their meaning. Consider the 
word 'atom'. This word has been used in science since the ancient Greeks. 
Their concept of atom held that all substances were formed of their own 
particular atoms (there was an atom of milk, an atom of blood, an atom of 
glass and so on). Each substance was made up of a large number of similar 
atoms; the concept implied that there was a very large number of different 
atoms. Later the word atom came to mean an unbreakable unit of matter, and 
substances could be compounded of several different atoms. The number of 
possible different atoms was consequently greatly reduced. It was difficult to 
decide how many distinct atoms there were, so elaborated rules were 
constructed to decide this. Eventually the construct, atom, became very 
sharply defined and scientists could state that all materials were made from a 
defined number of them. Since that time of certainty the picture has clouded. 
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The discovery of isotopes and of elements beyond uranium required that the 
construct be changed. More recently, quantum theory has necessitated a 
further reconstruction of the word. Science no longer defines atoms as the 
indestructible building blocks of matter since many sub-atomic particles have 
now been defined. The point being made here is that the concept atom does 
not exist out in the world somewhere waiting to be discovered; the word is 
undergoing a process of continual revision of meaning in the light of further 
explorations of the world. 
This reduction of the world to manageable aspects should be understood 
for what it is. Rather than science being thought of as a 'given' feature of the 
world around us, the learner needs to appreciate that science has been 
constructed by people as a way of making better sense of the world. 
This has obvious implications for science teaching and learning. If science 
develops by taking decisions about what would make better sense of the 
world, then teaching approaches could describe this procedure candidly and 
at a level appropriate to the learners' knowledge at the time. 
Scientists, then, deal with an idea such as floating and sinking by tidying 
up the world and then inventing powerful ideas to make better sense of it. 
This process involves conscious building of new ideas from prior knowledge. 
There is a tension here between reducing the world to 'manageable' simplicity 
and then treating systems as a whole. A vital debate about the difference 
between Western science and other means of knowing would be informed by 
students being aware of this tension (Christie, 1991). 
Question 3: Is there a single explanation for the phenomena 
of floating and sinking, energy, and photosynthesis which 
teachers should aim at? 
A common view of science is that there is a single scientifically acceptable 
description or explanation which teachers need to instil in their students. This 
is frequently apparent when teachers talk about how they should never tell 
their students anything that is wrong, and that the end result of any sequence 
of lessons is to produce the right answer. This encomium places an impossible 
burden on teachers, one which some are not aware of. School science can only 
be provisional knowledge leading towards the scientist's construct. In most 
cases this scientist's concept is inaccessible to students but transitional 
concepts can be valuably addressed. Preparedness to acknowledge the 
provisional nature of their learning and to accept that future change will be 
necessary may be a very valuable part of science teaching and learning. If we 
consider the concept of floating and sinking, the following explanations of 
why an apple floats are useful provisional concepts for learners from which 
the scientist's concept could be developed. 
The apple floats because: 
• it is light for its size 
• it is held up by the water 
• the upthrust of the water is equal to the weight of the apple 
• the weight of the water displaced is equal to the weight of the apple 
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• the apple's density is less than the density of water 
• the difference in water pressure below and above the apple results in a net 
upward force equal to the weight of the apple. 
The level of explanation depends on the purpose of the exploration and the 
background of the person for whom explanation is being provided. It is 
inappropriate for classroom interactions to convey the impression that there 
is a single correct explanation of any phenomenon or a single definition of any 
concept. This is a challenge to the pedagogy of most teachers. 
Question 4: Can science always provide an answer to a 
question? 
There are at least two instances in the survey which test the scientific view of 
floating and sinking to the limit; the spider standing on the surface of the 
water, and the stone skipping on the water. Indeed, these exemplars remind 
us that in the current description of phenomena, 'floating' and 'sinking' are 
inappropriate terms for their analysis. The two instances show a water surface 
and objects associated with it, yet we have real difficulty in answering the 
question 'Is the object floating?' and so does the scientist. Some scientists would 
say that the spider is floating because it is supported by the water. Others 
would say that the phenomenon involved here is surface tension and that the 
spider is not floating but rather supported by a 'skin' on the top of the water. 
We can support a needle on a water surface by carefully lowering it onto the 
surface, but this needle will sink if the surface is disturbed or some detergent 
is added to the water. The concept of floating held by most scientists requires 
that water is displaced, but in the case of the spider this may be said not to 
have happened. 
What about the stone skipping on the water? This is a tricky one since the 
movement of the stone is vital for it to remain on top of the surface. When its 
speed drops sufficiently the stone will sink. Science cannot answer the question 
'Is the object floating?' in the spirit in which it was asked, even though it looks 
like a perfectly reasonable one. (There are similar problems with the 
speedboat, though in this case the boat may well float if it stops moving). The 
scientific idea of floating and sinking is embarrassed when objects are in 
motion because the idea then becomes too complex for a straightforward 
analysis. 
The implications of this for teaching are clear. Young learners are very 
likely to ask questions which do not fit tidily into the constructs of science 
even though they seem simple. The apparent simplicity of the language 
conceals a very difficult problem. A teacher who understands that science 
does not have all the answers may feel more comfortable about helping a 
student to explore the world than the teacher who feels threatened by 
challenging questions. It should not be considered unprofessional for a 
teacher to acknowledge that some questions are unanswerable at the level of 
knowledge of science of the learner. This issue becomes clearer through some 
other examples of apparently simple questions, like: 'Is there more energy in 
a glass of milk than a glass of water?'. The proper answer to this question is 
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that there is insufficient information for an answer to be given. We need to 
know what happens next. As already discussed, the nature of science is to 
exclude from the system past history and future possibilities. In this case there 
are a number of possible futures. If the glasses are drunk then one analysis 
applies; however, if they are thrown at something then the analysis changes. 
The question can be answered but only when more information is provided. 
Again a simple question, posed in apparently exact terms is one which cannot 
be answered. Questions like this can be good questions for exploration of 
basic understanding. 
The last question comes to the heart of the construction of ideas in science, 
since it explores the process of change in the constructed meanings of ideas. 
Question 5: When a 'better' explanation is suggested, how 
do scientists decide whether to accept it? 
If science is not a set of truths which exists independently of people then in 
the construction of this structured complex of ideas there will often need to be 
changes made to ideas. This process of changing prior ideas is also the core 
activity of education so the issue of acceptance or rejection of a new idea is an 
important one both for science and for science education. We now know that 
learners often retain their prior meanings for words rather than taking on new 
meanings and we also know that this situation is often not apparent to the 
teacher. If your idea of floating was based on an object being above the water 
surface, then introduction of the 'better' idea that floating involves support by 
the water will have caused problems. You would need to have explored the 
new idea and found it to be more helpful and to offer better explanations 
before you would feel comfortable with it. 
Scientists have frequently had to face this difficulty. Although a popular 
image of scientists is that they quickly accept new discoveries, the history of 
science shows that many scientists have continued to disagree with 
developments in their field for very long times (one commentator on the 
history of ideas has remarked that new theories in science are finally accepted 
when the last opponent dies of old age). When an idea has become part of the 
way that you think about the world, changing that idea will mean 
overcoming barriers which can be very difficult to break down. Nevertheless, 
there are some 'rules of the game' of changing ideas that can be offered. They 
have to do with new ideas being: 
• more parsimonious (if a single explanation encompasses several others 
then science tends to prefer the more inclusive) 
• more elegaht and coherent (if the new idea is tidy and links to a greater 
number of other ideas then it will be preferred) 
• able to explain what is already known and also to predict some unknown 
outcomes. Ideas are preferred which have explanatory and predictive 
power. 
There can be valuable debate over these statements. The point made here 
is that addressing them would assist learners and teachers to explore the 
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process of the construction of scientific knowledge. Much of the current 
critique of science and its products does not confront the nature of science and 
the procedures used in its construction. The best criticism comes from 
understanding these rules, followed by an analysis of their consequences. 
Many of our students reject science without any understanding of the power 
of its constructs and the manner by which these have been constructed. 
The important point for our discussion here is that when teachers are 
encouraging students to adopt a different construction of a concept, classroom 
activities require more than statements which outline the new meaning, 
perhaps followed by some exercises. Learners need time to consider their 
prior meanings, to explore new ideas, to link them to other existing ideas, and 
to construct new meanings knowing what the requirements are for this 
reconstruction. The false view of science which holds that scientists are 
rapidly converted to new ideas has resulted in classroom approaches to 
science which too often assume that changing ideas is an easy procedure. The 
most important feature of an approach to science classes which addresses the 
difficulty of changing ideas is conversation. Science lessons which continually 
seek learners' ideas, which help to clarify them, and which provide an open 
and unthreatening environment for changing these ideas through 
conversation are classes in which learning in science can be improved. The 
false idea that science is exact and therefore that concepts in science are 
unproblematic can be argued to have trapped science teaching into a 
pedagogy which misrepresents both the content of science and the process 
whereby this content is constructed. 
~ Summary 
This chapter argues that classroom teaching and learning should address the 
processes of constructing and reconstructing scientific knowledge. A number 
of issues arise naturally in the classroom which enable teachers to explore the 
nature of science. These include: 
• how, by building up experiences and trying to make better sense of them, 
scientists construct concepts - which are not 'out there' in the world 
waiting to be uncovered 
• how science takes the richly complex world of experience and reduces it to 
a more manageable one in order to make more powerful statements 
• how science often focuses on a defined system as it is at the moment and 
ignores previous history or possible futures unless these are clearly stated 
• that there are a number of apparently simple questions about the world 
that may be very difficult for science to answer 
• that the rules for deciding that a proposed explanation is better include 
notions of elegance, parsimony and greater connectedness as well as those 
of plausibility, intelligibility and fruitfulness. The process of making a 
substantial change to the ideas of science is one which has aroused and 
continues to arouse argument and even passion. 
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